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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan*
and Ashby L. Kent"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2009 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions relating
to federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, several of which involved issues of first
impression. This Article analyzes several recent developments in the
Eleventh Circuit, including significant rulings in the areas of civil
procedure, subject matter jurisdiction, arbitration, and statutory
interpretation.'
II.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Whether a District Court Can Sua Sponte Remand an Action
Based on a Purely ProceduralDefect in a Notice of Removal
In Corporate Management Advisors, Inc. v. Artjen Complexus, Inc.,2
the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of "whether the failure to allege
facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction in a notice of
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removal is a defect in the removal procedure."3 The court concluded
that the failure to establish subject matter jurisdiction in a notice of
removal is a procedural defect in the removal process, and the court
further held that a "district court cannot sua sponte remand a case to
state court" based on such a procedural defect.4
In CorporateManagement Advisors, the defendants sought to remove
a lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332' on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction.' "[Intheir notice of removal, the [defendants] alleged only
the residency of one of the parties, rather than his citizenship."7 "Since
residency is not the equivalent of citizenship for diversity purposes, the
district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction"
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)' and remanded the case sua sponte to
state court.9 The defendants subsequently "filed an amended notice of
removal in which [ they contend[edl they alleged sufficient facts to
establish complete diversity of citizenship," but the district court
remanded the case again. ° Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d),1' "[the
district court concluded that . . . it lacked jurisdiction to review a

remand order 'on appeal or otherwise.'"' 2 The defendants "appeal[ed]
the district court's refusal to allow them to amend their notice of
removal [I pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)'s prohibition on review of a
remand order 'on appeal or otherwise. ' " "
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that "the district court based its
sua sponte remand order on a perceived lack of subject matter jurisdiction"-the absence of complete diversity-under § 1447(c). 14 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1447.1" The court first noted that a "district court

3. Id. at 1295. The court noted that although it had previously addressed this
question in In re FirstNationalBank of Boston, 70 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated, 102
F.3d 1577 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), that opinion had been vacated. Corp. Mgmt.
Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1295 n.1. Thus, the court noted that it had "no binding precedent
to guide [it]" on this issue. Id.
4. Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1295.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
6. Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1295.
7. Id.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006).
9. Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1295-96.
10. Id. at 1296.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006).
12. Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1296 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)).
13. Id. at 1297-98 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)).
14. Id. at 1296.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2006); Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1296.
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may remand a case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at
any time"1 6 and that "a remand order based on subject matter jurisdiction is not reviewable" on appeal." However, the court held that it did
have "jurisdiction to review whether the 'district court exceeded its
authority under § 1447(c) by remanding th[el case because of a perceived
procedural defect in the removal process without waiting for a party's
Citing its prior holding in Whole Health
motion'" to remand."8
Chiropractic& Wellness, Inc. v. Humana Medical Plan, Inc.,9 the court
noted that
[tihe language of § 1447(c), especially Congress's use of the language
"a motion to remand... must be made," in connection with a remand
based on a procedural defect in the removal process, and the lack of
that phrase with respect to removal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, indicates that the district court must wait for a party's
motion before remanding a case based on procedural defect.'
The Eleventh Circuit further "conclude[d] that the failure to establish
a party's citizenship at the time of filing the removal notice [constituted]
a 'procedural, rather than [a] jurisdictional, defect.'" 1 In so holding,
the court relied on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in In re Allstate Insurance Co.,22 a procedurally
analogous case in which the district court remanded a case to state court
because the defendant failed to adequately allege a party's citizenship
in its notice of removal. 23 "On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
'a "procedural defect" within the meaning of § 1447(c) refers to any
defect that does not go to the question of whether the case originally
could have been brought in [a] federal district court.'" 24 The Fifth

16.

Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1296 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).

17. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)). The court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
is tightly circumscribed to cover only remand orders within the scope of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c), based on (1) a district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction or (2)
a defect in removal other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction that was raised
by the motion of a party within 30 days after the notice of removal was filed.
Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008)).
18. 561 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Whole Health Chiropractic & Wellness, Inc. v. Humana
Med. Plan, Inc., 254 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001)).
19. 254 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2001).
20. Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Whole Health Chiropractic, 254

F.3d at 1320-21).
21. Id. (quoting In re Allstate Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1993)).
22. 8 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 1993).
23. Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1296-97 (citing In re Allstate, 8 F.3d at 220).

24. Id. at 1297 (quoting In re Allstate, 8 F.3d at 221).
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Circuit concluded that the failure to allege the plaintiff's citizenship in
the notice of removal was "'a procedural, rather than [a] jurisdictional,
defect.'"25 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court
lacked the discretion to remand the action sua sponte because the failure
to allege citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction was a purely
procedural defect in the removal process.26
The Eleventh Circuit "agree[d] with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation
of § 1447(c) and [its] construction of a party's failure to establish
citizenship in its notice of removal as a procedural defect," as opposed to
a jurisdictional defect.27 The Eleventh Circuit held this interpretation
to be consistent with the fact that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653,28
procedural shortcomings such as defective allegations of jurisdiction
could be cured.29 The court held that "[i]f a party fails to specifically
allege citizenship in [its] notice of removal, the district court should
allow that party 'to cure the omission,' as authorized by § 1653. " °
Accordingly, upon holding "that the district court erred by remanding
th[e] case on jurisdictional grounds when faced solely with a procedural
defect in the removal process," the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's remand order and directed the district court to allow the
defendants leave to amend their notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1653.31

25. Id. (quoting In re Allstate, 8 F.3d at 221).
26. Id. (citing Harmon v. OKI Sys., 115 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 1997)).
27. Id.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (2006).
29. Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1297 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1653). "Section 1653
provides that '[diefective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the
trial or appellate courts.'" Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1653). "'[Wihere subject matter
jurisdiction exists and any procedural shortcomings may be cured by resort to § 1653, we
can surmise no valid reason for the court to decline the exercise of jurisdiction.'" Id.
(quoting In re Allstate, 8 F.3d at 223).
30. Id. (quoting D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 146-47
(5th Cir. 1979)).
31. Id. at 1298. The court explained that its holding was consistent with its prior
opinion in Armada Coal Export, Inc. v. Interbulk, Ltd., 726 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1984), in
which the defendant "imperfectly pled" diversity jurisdiction as the ground for its removal
to federal court. Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1297 (quoting Armada Coal, 726 F.2d
at 1568). In Armada Coal, the Eleventh Circuit "remanded the case to district court with
instructions to grant the party leave to amend its notice of removal to 'unequivocally'
establish diversity of citizenship." Id. (citing Armada Coal, 726 F.2d at 1568-69).
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B. Whether the Failureof the United States Marshal to Effectuate
Service on Behalf of an In Forma PauperisPlaintiff Constitutes "Good
Cause" for the Plaintiff's Failureto Effect Timely Service Within the
Meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)
In Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc.,32 the Eleventh Circuit held
as a matter of first impression that the failure of the United States
Marshal to effectuate service on behalf of a plaintiff proceeding in forma
pauperis, through no fault of that plaintiff, constitutes "good cause"
within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) 33 for the

plaintiff's failure to effect timely service.34 In Rance the pro se plaintiff
filed a lawsuit against his former employer in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging that his employment
was terminated in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193835
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990.36

In its order

granting the plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the district
court stated as follows: "[T]he Clerk of Court is instructed to prepare the
summons and copies of the complaint and same shall be served by the
Marshal shall file a return of service once
U.S. Marshal. The U.S.
37
service is completed."

"[Olne-hundred and eighty-six days after [the plaintiff] filed his
complaint, the district court sua sponte issued an 'Order to Show Cause,'
ordering [the plaintiff to show cause [as to] why his case should not be
dismissed for failure to" perfect service of process. 3' The plaintiff did
not respond to the show cause order, and the district court dismissed the
plaintiff's case without prejudice. 39 The plaintiff appealed,
[rlelying on decisions from other circuits [and] argu[ing] that the
complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to serve [process]
because the court clerk and the U.S. Marshal failed to prepare the

32. 583 F.3d 1284 (lth Cir. 2009).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
34. Rance, 583 F.3d at 1288.
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2006); Rance, 583 F.3d at 1285.
37. Rance, 583 F.3d at 1285 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id. The plaintiff contended
that he did not respond to the.., show cause order because (1) he was ...in the
hospital with ...kidney failure during the period in which the district court
requested a response, and (2) he did not receive [a copy] of the show cause order
until after he was discharged from the hospital.
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summons and complaint and serve [the defendant] as expressly
directed by the district court and required by law.4"
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first noted that it had not yet
explained the proper standard of review for a sua sponte dismissal
pursuant to Rule 4(m). 4 ' The court held that an abuse of discretion
was the proper standard of review because the court applies this
standard to "a [district] court's decision to grant an extension of time
under Rule 4(m)" and a district "court's dismissal without prejudice of
a plaintiff's complaint for failure to timely serve a defendant under Rule
42
4(m)."
In reviewing the district court's dismissal for abuse of discretion, the
Eleventh Circuit first looked to the plain language of Rule 4(m), which
provides as follows:
If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is
filed, the court-on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff-must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant
or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the
plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the
time for service for an appropriate period.43
The court noted that "good cause" for failure to make timely service
"exists 'when some outside factor, such as reliance on faulty advice,
The
rather than inadvertence or negligence, prevented service.' 44
court further noted that "[elven if a district court finds that a plaintiff
failed to show good cause, 'the district court must still consider whether
any other circumstances warrantled] an extension of time'" to perfect
service before dismissing the case. 45 The court explained that "[olnly
after considering whether any such factors exist may the district court
exercise its discretion and either dismiss the case without prejudice or
direct that service be effected within a specified time."46

40. Id.
41. Id. at 1286.
42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll County
Comm'rs, 476 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2007). The court noted the abuse of discretion
standard of review required it to "affirm unless we find that the district court has made
a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004)).
43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 4(m)).
44. Id. (quoting Lepone.Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 1281.
45. Id. (quoting Lepone.Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 1282.
46. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lepone-Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 1282).
The court further noted that "Rule 4(m) grants discretion to the district court to extend the
time for service of process, even in the absence of a showing of good cause." Id. (internal
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The court then turned to the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 4 which
provides that "'[tihe officers of the court shall issue and serve all
process, and perform all duties'" when a litigant proceeds in forma
pauperis. 4' The court compared this language with the language of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c),49 which provides that "'[tihe court
must so order [service to be made by a United States Marshal or deputy
marshal] if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under
28 U.S.C § 1915. ' ""° Accordingly, the court reasoned that
[tlogether, Rule 4(c)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) stand for the proposition that when a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis the court is
obligated to issue plaintiff's process to a United States Marshal who
must in turn effectuate service upon the defendants, thereby relieving
a plaintiff of the burden to serve process once reasonable steps have
been taken to identify for the court the defendants named in the
complaint.5
Noting that it had not yet addressed the application of Rule 4(m) in
this "unique factual context," the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that its
"sister circuits have held that a plaintiff has shown 'good cause' for
purposes of a dismissal pursuant to Rule 4(m) when a United States
Marshal has failed to properly serve process through no fault of the
plaintiff."52 The court also looked to its prior opinion in Fowler v.
Jones,53 in which the court addressed "'the role of the clerk of the court
and the U.S. Marshal Service in serving complaints of parties proceeding
in forma pauperis' [in] the [context] of a district court's denial of a
motion for continuance."54 In Fowler the district court allowed a pro se
plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis in an action filed under 42 U.S.C.

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Horenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132
(11th Cir. 2005)).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006).
48. Rance, 583 F.3d at 1286 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c).
50. Rance, 583 F.3d at 1286 (alterations im original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)).
51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Byrd v. Stone, 94 F.3d 217,219 (6th
Cir. 1996)).
52. Id. at 1287 (citing Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam); Byrd, 94 F.3d at 220; Dumaguin v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 28 F.3d 1218,
1221 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Puett v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir. 1990); Sellers v.
United States, 902 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1990); Rochon v. Dawson, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110
(5th Cir. 1987); Romandette v. Weetabix Co., 807 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir. 1986)).
53. 899 F.2d 1088 (11th Cir. 1990).
54. Rance, 583 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1094).
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§ 1983." The plaintiff had named four defendants in his complaint,
and he objected at the trial "when the district court indicated that there
was only one defendant."56 The defense counsel explained that only one
defendant had been served, and the plaintiff "requested a continuance
in order to serve the other defendants."" The district court denied the
plaintiff's request, and the plaintiff appealed.5" The Eleventh Circuit
"reversed, finding that the district court abused its discretion in denying
the continuance."" Relying on decisions from other circuits, in Fowler
the Eleventh Circuit "held that 'in forma pauperis litigants should be
entitled to rely on the court officers and United States Marshals to effect
proper service, and should not be penalized for failure to effect service
6
where such failure is not due to fault on the litigant's part.'" 1
Relying on Fowler and opinions from its sister circuits cited therein,
in Rance the Eleventh Circuit held "that the failure of the United States
Marshal to effectuate service on behalf of an in forma pauperis plaintiff
through no fault of that plaintiff constitutes 'good cause' for the
plaintiff's failure to effect timely service within the meaning of Rule
4(m)."6 ' Applying that holding to the facts at issue in Rance, the court
held that because the district court had allowed the plaintiff to proceed
in forma pauperis, the plaintiff was allowed to rely on the United States
Marshal to effect timely and proper service on the defendant.
The
Eleventh Circuit further noted that the district court had "specifically
instructed the United States Marshal to make service" in its order
granting the plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis.1 3 Because
nothing in the record indicated that the plaintiff shared the United
States Marshal's fault in failing to effectuate proper or timely service,
the Eleventh Circuit held that "the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing [the plaintiff's] complaint without prejudice under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)."64

55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Rance, 583 F.3d at 1287-88 (citing Fowler, 899 F.2d at
1090-91).
56. Rance, 583 F.3d at 1288 (citing Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1090-91).
57. Id. (citing Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1092).
58. Id. (citing Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1092).
59. Id. (citing Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1096).
60. Id. (quoting Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1095).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT CASES

A. Whether Claims Brought Pursuantto the Credit Repair
OrganizationsAct Are Subject to Arbitration
In Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit addressed
as a matter of first impression whether claims brought under the Credit
Repair Organizations Act (CROA) 66 are subject to arbitration. 6' The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held
that claims brought pursuant to the CROA are not subject to arbitration.6' The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and vacated the judgment of the
district court.6 9
In Picard the plaintiff, Elizabeth Picard, contacted the defendant,
Credit Solutions of America, Inc. (CSA), a debt settlement company, to
discuss a possible plan to manage her debt.7" During their telephone
conversations, a CSA representative told "Picard that if she entered into
an agreement for a debt management plan with CSA, CSA would
negotiate settlements and reductions of her outstanding debts with her
creditors."7' "Picard entered into a contract with CSA [over] the
Internet during her [telephone] conversation with" the CSA representative.72 The contract included a "customer enrollment package," which
contained the following arbitration provision:
If there is any dispute between the parties arising out of this agree-

ment, the parties agree to submit the dispute to binding arbitration
under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). If
such arbitration is held under the auspices of any other organization,
the arbitration will be held in accord with AAA rules to the extent
possible. Binding arbitration means that both parties give up their
right to a trial by jury and to appeal except for a narrow range of

65. 564 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2009).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679-1679j (2006).
67. Picard, 564 F.3d at 1251, 1254.
68. Id. at 1251.
69. Id. at 1251, 1256.
70. Id. at 1251. A debt settlement company is a company "that negotiates with
unsecured creditors on behalf of its customers to lower the customers' debt loads and
monthly payments." Id.
71. Id. Specifically, the CSA representative "proposed a structure whereby CSA would
make direct withdrawals from Picard's bank account" and then pay her creditors. Id.
"Picard would pay [CSA] for th[is] service [by] direct withdrawals from her bank account."
Id.
72. Id.
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issues that may be appealed under Texas law. Discovery may be
limited by the arbitrator.73
Shortly after she entered into the debt management plan with CSA,
"Picard began receiving telephone calls and letters from [her] creditors
telling her that she was in default on her accounts."74 Picard maintained that her defaults were due to CSA's failure to perform under the
debt management agreement.7 5 Picard filed suit against CSA, "alleging
violations of CROA, breach of an oral contract and fraudulent inducement."76
"CSA moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to compel
arbitration based on [the] arbitration clause in the customer enrollment
package."7 7 Picard opposed CSA's motion, arguing "that the arbitration
clause did not apply because she did not sign an agreement with
CSA."7 8
Following an evidentiary hearing on CSA's motion, the district court
found that CSA was a "credit repair organization" subject to the CROA.
The district court further found that although Picard had entered into
an agreement with CSA that contained an arbitration provision, the
arbitration provision was unenforceable because the CROA's disclosure
and non-waiver provisions precluded arbitration. CSA appealed, arguing
that the CROA does not preclude arbitration and that the district court's
finding that CSA was a credit repair organization subject to the CROA
was premature.79
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held
that the CROA does not preclude arbitration and does not create a nonwaivable right to a judicial forum." In so holding, the court acknowledged that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)8" creates a strong federal
policy in favor of arbitration and that "'[sitatutorily-created causes of
action are no exception to the rule that arbitration agreements should

73. Id. at 1252 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id. at 1251-52.
75. Id. at 1252.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. At the evidentiary hearing on CSA's motion, the district court received into
evidence the audio recording of Picard's conversation with the CSA representative. Id.
After the hearing, Picard changed her argument to contend "that the arbitration clause was
not applicable (1) because the CROA voids the arbitration clause, and (2) because the
agreement as a whole [was] void" because it was induced by fraud. Id.
79. Id. Picard brought a contingent cross-appeal, arguing that her fraud claim should
be heard in a judicial forum in the event that the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's holding that the CROA precludes arbitration. Id.
80. Id. at 1255-56.
81. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
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be enforced according to their terms.'"82 Accordingly, the court held
that when "parties agree to arbitrate disputes brought pursuant to
federal statute, the statutory claims are subject to arbitration 'unless
Congress has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue.'"8
The court then turned to the text of the CROA's disclosure and nonwaiver provisions to determine whether Congress intended to preclude
arbitration of claims brought pursuant to the CROA.' The disclosure
provision of the CROA provides that "'[any credit repair organization
shall provide any consumer with the following written statement before
any contract or agreement between the consumer and the credit repair
organization is executed.' 8 5
The disclosure provision then
lists the items that must be included in the written statement, which
include, inter alia, notice of the right to a copy of one's credit report,
notice of the right to dispute inaccurate information in a credit report,
and notice of the right to cancel a contract with a credit repair
any reason within three business days from the date
organization for
6
of execution.
For purposes of the case at bar, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the
key element required in the written disclosure was the following: "You
have a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the Credit
Repair Organization Act. This law prohibits deceptive practices by
credit repair organizations. "s"

The court then looked to the CROA's non-waiver provision, which
provides that "[a]ny waiver by any consumer of any protection provided
by or any right of the consumer under this subchapter-(1) shall be
treated as void; and (2) may not be enforced by any Federal or State
court or any other person."' Noting that the issue of whether the
CROA prohibits arbitration was an issue of first impression in the
Eleventh Circuit,8 9 the court turned to the only circuit court decision

82. Picard,564 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes, 253 F.3d 611,
617 (11th Cir. 2001)).
83. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a)).
86. Id. at 1254 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a)).
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a)).
88. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a)).
89. Id.
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on this issue, Gay v. CreditInform,90 in which the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that CROA claims are arbitrable. 9' In Gay the Third Circuit "noted the absence of legislative history
indicating an intent to preclude arbitration."9 2 The Third Circuit also
found that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate any conflict between
arbitration and the enforcement of the CROA; rather, the rights afforded
by the CROA would remain intact in an arbitration proceeding. 93
The Third Circuit in Gay also relied on the fact "that [the] CROA does
not contain language creating a right to a judicial forum."94 The Third
Circuit likened the CROA's non-waiver provision, entitled "Noncompliance with this subchapter," to the "compliance" language found in the
non-waiver provisions of the Securities Act of 193395 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.6 The court in Picard noted that "[t]he Exchange Act's non-waiver provision provides that '[any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with
any provision of [the Act] ... shall be void.'" 97 Citing the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,9" the Eleventh Circuit noted that because the Exchange
Act's "non-waiver provision only disallowed waivers of 'compliance' with
the Exchange Act, the Exchange Act only precluded waiver of its
substantive requirements." 99 Accordingly, "[an agreement to arbitrate
was permissible under the [Exchange Act] because it would not waive

90. 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007). The Eleventh Circuit noted that the plaintiff in Gay
had made many of the same arguments as Picard, all of which the Third Circuit had
rejected. Picard, 564 F.3d at 1254.
91. Picard,564 F.3d at 1254. The court also noted that numerous district courts had
agreed with the Third Circuit's holding in Gay that CROA claims are subject to arbitration.
Id. (citing Vegter v. Forecast Fin. Corp., No. 1:07-CV-279, 2007 WL 4178947 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 20, 2007); Schreiner v. Credit Advisors Inc., No. 8:07-CV-78, 2007 WL 2904098 (D.
Neb. Oct. 2, 2007); Rex v. CSA-Credit Solutions of Am., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 788 (W.D.
Mich. 2007)).
92. Id. (citing Gay, 511 F.3d at 382).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Gay, 511 F.3d at 381-82).
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006); Picard, 564 F.3d at 1254. The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that the court in Gay "construe[d]. . . [the] CROA's [non]-waiver provision as only
extending to rights premised on the imposition of statutory duties, absent contrary
language in the statute." Picard, 564 F.3d at 1254 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Gay, 511 F.3d at 385).
97. Picard,564 F.3d at 1254 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2006)).
98. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
99. Picard, 564 F.3d at 1254-55 (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228).
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The court
compliance with any substantive provision of' that law.'
the nonheld
that
Court
Supreme
later
"the
years
further noted that two
arbitration"
permitted
waiver language in the Securities Act also
because it likewise "extended [only] to 'compliance with any provision'
of the Securities Act."' 0 ' Accordingly, "waiver of the jurisdictional
10 2
provision did not constitute waiving 'compliance' with the Act."
Although the Eleventh Circuit noted that the CROAs non-waiver
provision was "phrased in broader terms than the non-waiver provisions
in the Securities Act and Exchange Act," the court agreed with the Third
Circuit's decision that the "CROA simply does not create a right to sue
[exclusively] in a judicial forum."0 3 The Eleventh Circuit also agreed
0 4
and
that the text of the CROA makes no mention of arbitration,
preserved
entirely
are
CROA
[by
the]
created
"[the substantive rights
in an arbitral forum." 05
The Eleventh Circuit further explained that the only right created in
the CROA's disclosure provision is the right to a statement concerning
The court noted that "[tihe 'right to sue' refercertain disclosures."
enced in the required disclosure is set forth separately in the civil
liability section, . . . which does not mention the word 'right,' the
" v
expression 'right to sue,' or place any limitation on arbitration. 10
"Although [the] CROA requires credit repair organizations to inform
consumers of their right to a private cause of action," the court held that
a statute's provision for a private cause of action alone does not exclude
arbitration.1 0 8 Accordingly, the court held that "the appropriate forum
for resolving this dispute is an arbitral forum" and that "any other
issues, such as whether [the] CROA applies to CSA, are for the
arbitrator" and should be addressed in arbitration." 9

100. Id. at 1255 (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228).
101. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77n; Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 482-83 (1989)).
102. Id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481-83.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1985)).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1679g(a)).
108. Id. "'A statute's provision for a private right of action alone is inadequate to show
that Congress intended to prohibit arbitration.'" Id. (quoting Davis v. S.Energy Homes
Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002)).
109. Id. at 1256.
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B. Whether a Debt Collector Is Entitled to the "Bona Fide Error"
Defense Under the FairDebt Collection PracticesAct When the
Collector Intentionally Violates One Provision of the Act to Avoid
Violating Another Provision
In Edwards v. NiagaraCredit Solutions, Inc.,110 the Eleventh Circuit
held that a debt collection agency subject to the provisions of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)"' could not avail itself of the
FDCPA's "bona fide error" defense when the debt collector intentionally
violated one provision of the FDCPA to avoid the risk of violating
another provision of the FDCPA." 2 In Edwards the defendant debt
collection agency left numerous prerecorded voice messages on the
plaintiff's answering machine but intentionally failed to disclose in any
of the messages that it was a debt collector or that the purpose of the
calls was to collect a debt from the plaintiff."' Although the FDCPA
"specifically requires ... debt collector[s to] disclose in all communications with [the] debtor that the message is from a debt collector,"" 4 the
defendant "deliberately chose not to comply with that requirement
because it feared that doing so would risk violating another provision of
the [FDCPA], which .. .forbids an agency from communicating about

the debt with a third party."" 5 Specifically, the debt collector "was
concerned that [the] answering machine messages might be played by or
within the hearing of [the debtor's] family member or roommate, who
would then6 know that a collection agency was calling the debtor" about
1
the debt.

The plaintiff debtor sued the debt collector in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging that the
defendant's messages violated § 1692e(11)" 7 and § 1692d(6)1 8 of the

110. 584 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2009).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16 9 2 -1 6 9 2 p (2006).
112. Edwards, 584 F.3d at 1353-54.
113. Id. at 1351. At the time of the phone calls, the debt collector "had a well-defined
policy about messages that it left on debtors' answering machines." Id. The "policy was
to: leave a message asking the debtor to call back about an important matter; provide [the
debt collector's] phone number; supply the real first name of the person calling on behalf
of [the debt collector]; and give any reference number assigned to the account." Id.
114. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)).
115. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)).
116. Id. at 1351-52.
117. Section 1692e(11) of the FDCPA specifically requires that a debt collector disclose
in all communications with a debtor that the message is from a debt collector. Edwards,
584 F.3d at 1353.
118. Section 1692d(6) "requir[es] meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity."
Edwards, 584 F.3d at 1352.
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FDCPA." 9 The debt collector asserted numerous defenses, including,
pursuant to § 1692k(c) of the FDCPA, the bona fide error defense.12 °
The FDCPA's bona fide error defense "insulates [debt collectors] from
liability even when they have failed to comply with the [FDCPA's]
requirements." 12 1 The bona fide error defense under the FDCPA
provides as follows:
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this
subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence
that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide
error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid any such error.'22
The failure to meet any one of these requirements is fatal to the debt
collector's bona fide error defense under the FDCPA.'23
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
concluding that the messages left on the plaintiff's answering machine
violated the FDCPA and that the bona fide error defense did not
apply.'24
On appeal, the defendant conceded that the messages
violated the FDCPA but "challengled] the district court's conclusion that
it [was] not protected by the bona fide error defense."'25 Accordingly,
the issue before the court of appeals was whether a debt collector is
entitled to the bona fide error defense when the debt collector intentionally violates one provision of the FDCPA to avoid violating another
provision of the FDCPA. 26
In affirming the district court's ruling, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the defendant had failed to meet the required showing to establish that
the defendant was entitled to the bona fide error defense.' 27 First, the
court noted that by its own admission, the defendant decided not to
disclose that the caller was a debt collector. 12 Because the defendant
had intentionally failed to disclose its identity as a debt collector, the
court held that the defendant failed to meet the first prong129of the bona
fide error defense-that the violation was not intentional.

119. Edwards, 584 F.3d at 1352.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Johnson v. Riddle, 443 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2006)).
122. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c)).
123. Id. at 1353.
124. Id. at 1352.
125. Id.
126. Id.

127. Id. at 1353.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
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The court also held that the defendant "failed to meet the second
requirement of the bona fide error defense, which is that the violation
actually be a 'bona fide' error."' 3 0 The defendant admitted that "it was
concerned that disclosing that the call was from a debt collector could
result in a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which prohibits a debt
collector from communicating with third parties about the consumer's
debt."13' The court noted that the term bona fide under the FDCPA
"means that the error resulting in a violation was 'made in good faith;
a genuine mistake, as opposed to a contrived mistake.'"'3 2 In holding
that the defendant's alleged error was not bona fide, the court noted that
it was not objectively reasonable for the defendant to violate one
provision "of the [FDCPAI with every message [that] it left in order to
avoid the possibility that some of those messages might lead to a
violation of" another provision. 3 Because the court determined that
the defendant "ha[d] failed to meet either of the first two requirements
of the bona fide error defense of § 1692k(c)," the court affirmed the
district court's decision and explained that it need not decide whether
the defendant also had failed to meet the third requirement, which
mandates the maintenance
of procedures reasonably designed to avoid
134
violation of the FDCPA.

C. Whether a Consumer Reporting Agency Willfully Violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act When the Agency Sold a Consumer Report to a
CreditorAfter the Consumer Had Closed His Account with that
Creditor
In Levine v. World Financial Network National Bank, 35 the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of a consumer reporting agency on the issue
of whether the agency had willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Kort v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 394 F.3d 530, 538 (7th Cir.
2005)).
133. Id. at 1353-54.
134. Id. at 1354. The defendant complained that if it was not allowed to omit from its
answering machine messages the disclosures required by § 1692e(11), it would not be able
to leave messages on answering machines at all. Id. This complaint was based on the
defendant's assumption that "an answering machine message that includes the disclosure
required by § 1692e(11), if heard by a third party, would violate § 1692c(b)." Id. The court
noted that it had not decided the issue, and even if the defendant was correct, the answer
was that the FDCPA did "not guarantee a debt collector the right to leave answering
machine messages." Id.
135. 554 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2009).
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Act (FCRA) 36 when the agency sold a consumer's credit report to a
creditor for "account review" after the consumer closed his account with
the creditor.137 Reasoning that it was not objectively unreasonable for
the agency to interpret the FCRA to permit the sale of consumer reports
for consumers with closed accounts, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the agency.1 38
In Levine one of the defendants, Experian Information Systems, Inc.,
sold Stephen Levine's consumer report to a credit card issuer, Alliance
Data Systems, for what Alliance represented to be a semiannual account
review of "current customers."'3 9 At the time that Experian sold
Levine's consumer report to Alliance, Levine had closed his account and
was no longer a current customer of Alliance. 4 ° Levine filed a complaint against Experian in the United States District for the Northern
District Court of Georgia, alleging "that the [FCRA] did not permit the
sale of reports for consumers with closed accounts and that Experian
willfully had violated the [FCRA]" by selling Levine's account to
Alliance.'
Specifically,
Levine alleged that, because his account [with Alliance] was closed,
there was not an account for Alliance to review, and Alliance must
have sought the report for a purpose other than those permitted by the
[FCRA]. Levine [further] alleged that Experian failed to maintain
reasonable procedures to ensure that it furnished reports only for
permissible purposes.'42
Experian initially "moved to dismiss Levine's complaint for failure to
Levine
state a claim, and the district court granted [the] motion[]."'
appealed,144 and the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the
district court's order because "the pleadings did not resolve whether

136.
137.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006).
Levine, 554 F.3d at 1316.

138. Id.
139. Id. "Levine held a credit card [account] with a men's clothing retailer, Structure."
Id. The credit card was issued by a subsidiary of Alliance, World Financial National Bank.

Id.
140. Id. Levine's consumer report reflected that the account had been paid in full and
closed. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. "Levine alleged that both the sale[] of his report for an impermissible purpose
and the failure to maintain reasonable safeguards against that] sale[] were willful
violations of the [FCRAI." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Levine's claims against Structure and the bank were settled while Levine's
appeal was pending. Id. (citing Levine v. World Fin. Network Nat'l Bank, 437 F.3d 1118,
1120 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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Experian had reasonable grounds to believe that the consumer report
would be used for an impermissible purpose [or] whether Experian made
reasonable efforts to verify the validity of the request for the report."145
For purposes of that initial appeal, the court acknowledged that "[t]here
is a difference in opinion on whether the ambiguous language in [the
FCRA] contains an absolute prohibition against the sale of credit reports
to former creditors whose accounts are closed and paid in full."146 The
court reserved judgment on the ambiguity, because it did not need to
decide that issue in resolving the initial appeal from the grant of the
147
motion to dismiss.
"After discovery, Experian moved for summary judgment ...
argu[ing] that Levine could not prove a willful violation because the
[FCRA] was unclear about sales of reports for consumers with closed
accounts, and an interpretation that [such] sales were permitted was
reasonable." 4 ' Experian relied on an intervening decision by the
United States Supreme Court in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v.
Burr 49 "to support its argument that a company does not willfully
violate the [FCRA] by interpreting it erroneously [as] long as [the]
interpretation is not 'objectionably unreasonable.'" 50 Further,
Experian argued that the [FCRA] did not clearly prohibit the sale of a
consumer report for a closed account, and Experian cited [the Eleventh
Circuit's] acknowledgment that the [FCRA] provided "ambiguous"
guidance on the issue. Experian also argued that it was entitled to
summary judgment because [it] obtained an express certification from
Alliance that
the consumer reports would be used only for permissible
151
purposes.
Levine opposed Experian's motion for summary judgment, arguing "that
his account was closed when Experian sold his consumer report and...
that Experian must have known that Alliance planned to use the
report[] for an impermissible purpose."'52

145. Id. (citing Levine, 437 F.3d at 1122).
146. Id. at 1316-17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Levine, 437 F.3d at
1122). The court noted that this "difference of opinion [was] reflected by a decision of [the
Fifth Circuit] and an advisory letter from the Federal Trade Commission." Id. at 1317
(citing Levine, 437 F.3d at 1122).
147. Id. at 1317.
148. Id.
149. 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
150. Levine, 554 F.3d at 1317.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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The district court granted Experian's motion for summary judgment,
finding that the release of a customer credit report to the holder of a
closed account was permissible based on an objectively reasonable
interpretation of the statute.15 3 "The district court also concluded that
Levine had failed to prove that Experian did not maintain reasonable
procedures to ensure that the consumer reports [that] it sold were used
for permissible purposes."154 Levine appealed.155
In affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that
the FCRA "provides that consumer reporting agencies may furnish
consumer reports [only] for limited purposes"156 and that the "agencies
must maintain reasonable procedures to ensure compliance with the
[FCRA]."' 57 The court further noted that under the Supreme Court's
decision in Safeco, "[tlo prove a willful violation [of the FCRA], a
consumer must prove that [the] consumer reporting agency either
knowingly or recklessly violated the requirements of the [FCRA]."158
To prove a reckless violation, the court noted that "a consumer must
establish that the action of the agency 'is not only a violation under a
reasonable reading of the statute's terms, but shows that the company
ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk
associated with a reading that was merely careless.'"' 9 The court
further held that under Safeco, "laninterpretation [of the FCRA] that
favors the agency must be 'objectively unreasonable' under either the
text of the [FCRAI or 'guidance from the courts of appeals or the Federal
Trade Commission that might have warned [the agency] away from the
view it took." 6 °
Applying the reasoning in Safeco to Levine's case, the Eleventh Circuit
held that it was not objectively unreasonable for Experian to interpret
the FCRA to permit the sale of the consumer report to a creditor after
the consumer had closed his account with that creditor.161 Levine had
identified two provisions of the FCRA that permitted the sale of reports
for "account review," and he argued that Experian's sale of his report did
not satisfy either provision because his account was closed at the time
of the sale. 62 The first provision that Levine identified "allows a

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1316.
at 1317 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b).
at 1317-18 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681e).
at 1318 (citing Safeco, 551 U.S. at 56-57).
(quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69).
(fourth alteration in original) (quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69-70).
at 1319.
at 1318.
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creditor to examine a consumer report to ensure that a consumer
'continues to meet the terms of the account.'"'6 3 "[Tihe second provision ...allows the sale of [the] consumer report when the seller 'has
reason to believe [that the buyer] intends to use the information in
connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer . . . and
"Levine
involving the ... review or collection of an account.'""
argue[d] that neither of these provisions could apply to closed accounts"
and "that Experian actually knew that the [FCRA] did not permit sales
of reports for consumers whose accounts were closed because language
in letters from Experian to Alliance restricted the sales [of reports] to
'current customers.'"'65 Levine further argued that the district court's
findings could not be reconciled with the purpose of the FCRA "of
restricting access to consumers' confidential financial information."' 6
Disagreeing with Levine, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the
provisions Levine relied on did not clearly distinguish between open and
closed accounts, and the court could not determined that the term
account necessarily meant an open account.'67 The court also noted
that caselaw has not determined that the FCRA "forbids the sale of
Citing its prior
reports for consumers whose accounts are closed.""
analysis of the FCRA in Levine's first appeal, the court noted that the
language of the FCRA did not clearly or expressly prohibit the sale of
reports for consumers whose accounts were closed, and the court
reiterated that "'[there is a difference in opinion on whether the
ambiguous language in [the FCRA] contains an absolute prohibition
to former creditors whose accounts are
against the sale of credit" 1reports
69
closed and paid in full.'
Levine also claimed that Experian recklessly violated the FCRA,
stating that Experian's records indicated that Experian read the FCRA
"to prohibit the sale of reports on consumers whose accounts were
closed." 7 ° Again disagreeing with Levine, the Eleventh Circuit cited
the Supreme Court's holding in Safeco "that evidence of subjective bad

163. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(F)(ii)).
164. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting Levine, 437 F.3d at 1122). "Although Levine offer[ed] two staff
opinion letters from the Federal Trade Commission as evidence of a regulatory instruction
that reports [from] closed accounts may not be sold, [the Eleventh Circuit noted that] the
Supreme Court [in Safeco] has expressly declined to describe such letters as 'authoritative
guidance.'" Id. at 1319 (quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 & n.19).
170. Id. at 1319.
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faith cannot support 'a willfulness finding ... when the company's
reading of the statute is objectively reasonable."" 71 Because the
Eleventh Circuit determined Experian's interpretation of the FCRA-that agencies may sell reports of closed accounts-to be objectively
reasonable, the court held that pursuant to the Supreme Court's
instructions in Safeco, Experian's subjective intent should not be
considered.172
The Eleventh Circuit also disagreed with Levine's argument "that
interpreting the [FCRA] to allow sales of reports for closed accounts
'cannot be reconciled with the.., purpose [of the FCRAI of restricting
'
Instead,
access to consumers' confidential financial information.' 173
purpose
no
underlying
is
there
Safeco
the court noted that "under
is
FCRA
the
of
interpretation
an
whether
criterion to determine
74
the
and
FCRA
of
the
text
the
Rather,
objectively reasonable."'
authoritative interpretations of the FCRA are what matter under
Safeco.'7 5 Accordingly, the court held that "[a] consumer reporting
agency does not recklessly violate the [FCRA] when it acts in accord[ance] with an objectively reasonable interpretation of the [FCRA]."176
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that Experian did not willfully
violate the FCRA by neglecting to maintain reasonable procedures to
ensure that the consumer reports it provided were used only for
permissible purposes.1 77 Specifically, the court held that it did not
need to evaluate Experian's procedures because Experian's interpretation
of the FCRA as allowing the sale of consumer reports for a closed
account was not objectively unreasonable. 78 Accordingly, the court
held that "no investigation or procedure would have alerted Experian to
the possibility of an impermissible use," and that "[amny dearth of
reasonable compliance procedures cannot give rise to a willful violation
of the [FCRA]." 179

171. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 n.20).
172. Id.
173. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Brief of Appellant at 24, Levine v.
World Fin. Network Natl Bank, 554 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2009)).
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69-70).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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D. Whether the Statutory Damages Provision in Section 1681n(a)(1)(A) of the FairCredit Reporting Act is UnconstitutionallyVague
and Excessive
In Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit
considered whether FCRA's the statutory damages provision, found at
15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), is unconstitutionally vague and excessive.18 ' In Harriscredit card customers brought putative class actions
against the defendant merchants for alleged violations of the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA). 8 2 FACTA is a
2003 amendment to the FCRA that aims to protect consumers from
identity theft.'" FACTA states that "'no person that accepts credit
cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than
the last [five] digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any
receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.'"4

In Harristhe putative "classes include[d] every customer who engaged
in a credit or debit card transaction with one of the defendants after the
date FACTA became effective and whose electronically-generated receipt
included more than the last five digits of the customer's credit card
number and/or its expiration date."' 58 The plaintiffs filed suits in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,
alleging that the merchant defendants willfully violated FACTA and
sought punitive damages, statutory damages, litigation expenses, and
The defendants moved for
attorney fees pursuant to the FCRA.' 6
summary judgment, claiming that the FCRA's statutory damages
provision was unconstitutional."' The district court issued an order
dismissing the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice and declaring that the
FCRA's statutory damages provision was unconstitutionally vague and
excessive both on its face and as applied to the defendants. 8 On

180. 564 F.3d 1301 (l1th Cir. 2009).
181. Id. at 1306.
182. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681v (2006); Harris,564 F.3d at 1307.
183. Harris,564 F.3d at 1306.
184. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1)). "This provision applies to electronicallygenerated customer receipts, not those made by handwriting or imprinting a copy of the
card." Id. at 1306 n.1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(2)).
185. Id. at 1307.
186. Id.
187. Id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2006), the United States intervened as a
plaintiff to defend the statute's constitutionality. Harris, 564 F.3d at 1307.
188. Harris, 564 F.3d at 1307.
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appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague or excessive on its face.'89
1. The FCRA's Statutory Damages Provision
In determining the constitutionality of the FCRAs statutory damages
provision, the court examined the statutory language and evolution of
the FCRA and FACTA. 9 ° The court first noted that the FCRA permits
consumers to bring private actions for willful violations.191 "Originally,
the FCRA provided actual and punitive damages for willful violations."192 The FCRA was amended in 1996 to add "that victims of
willful violations could receive 'any actual damages sustained by the
consumer as a result of the failure or [statutory] damages of not less
than $100 and not more than $1,000.'""'1 "[T]he FCRA still allows
victims of willful violations to receive punitive damages."'9 4
The FCRA was amended further by the Credit and Debit Card Receipt
Clarification Act of 2007,195 which had been signed into law just a few
days after the district court's decision in Harris.9 ' The Eleventh
Circuit explained,
The Clarification Act applies to transactions that took place between
December 4, 2004, and June 3, 2008, exempting merchants from
liability for willful violations of the FCRA in cases where the merchant
printed credit card expiration dates on customer receipts, but 'otherwise complied' with FACTA. The Clarification Act applies retroactively
to all cases pending as of the time of its enactment. This means that

189. Id. at 1307-08. The court also vacated the district court's finding that the statute
was unconstitutionally excessive as applied to the defendants. Id. The Eleventh Circuit
explained that the district court had engaged in "impermissible speculation" because it had
"employed a series of assumptions," many of which involved disputed issues of fact, in
reaching its finding that "any verdict awarded by the jury would necessarily be
unconstitutionally excessive." Id. at 1309-10. The court held that "[o]nce the district
court's assumptions are removed, the as-applied excessiveness challenge is not ripe" for
adjudication. Id. at 1310. Accordingly, the court held that "[t]he district court therefore
lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the FCRA's statutory-damages provision is punitive
and will yield an unconstitutionally excessive verdict as applied to these defendants." Id.
190. Id. at 1306.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2412, 110 Stat. 3009-446 (1996) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(A)).
194. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2)).
195. Pub. L. 110-241, 122 Stat. 1565 (2008) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681n(d)).
196. 564 F.3d at 1306-07.
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to recover for willful FACTA violations that occurred prior to the
enactment of the Clarification Act, a customer must prove that the
merchant printed more than the last five digits of the customer's card
number on an electronically-generated receipt.'91
Proving only that the expiration date was printed on the receipt will no
longer support liability under FACTA.' 9
2.

Facial Challenges to the FCRA's Statutory Damages Provision

The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "the defendants' facial challenges
to the FCRA [were] sufficiently ripe for adjudication ... because they
[did] not require a detailed examination of the facts of the instant
case."' 99 The district court held that the statutory damages provision
was unconstitutional because it did not provide guidance for juries when
they are determining whether to award damages closer to the $100 or
$1000 damages numbers.200 As such, the district court found that the
statute always left damages "to the whim of the jury" and allowed
inconsistent, "willy nilly" verdicts, thereby rendering 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681n(a)(1)(A) unconstitutionally vague.201 The district court further
concluded that since § 1681n(a)(1)(A)'s "statutory-damages provision is
'expressly not compensatory in nature,' its verdicts [would] always be
unconstitutionally excessive. " 2 ° 2
(a) Facial Vagueness.
district court's reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit first examined the

that the absence of criteria for assessing the appropriate amount of
damages within § [1681n(a)(1)(A)'s] statutory-damages range renders
the section unconstitutionally vague. The [district] court reasoned that
without statutory criteria, it [would be] impossible for a judge to
adequately charge a jury on where an award should fall within the
$100 to $1,000 range.
The district court found "that this [absence] renders the FCRA's
statutory-damages provision unconstitutionally vague, in violation of due
2 °4
process."

197. Id. (citations omitted).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1308-09.
200. Id. at 1308.
201. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id. at 1308-09 (quoting Grimes v. Rave Motion Pictures Birmingham, L.L.C., 552
F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1308 (N.D. Ala. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Harris,564 F.2d 1301)).
203. Id. at 1310.
204. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit recognized that
the void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that a "statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law."0 5
The court further acknowledged that "[v]agueness within statutes is
impermissible because such statutes fail to put potential violators on
notice that certain conduct is prohibited, inform them of the potential
penalties that accompany noncompliance, and provide explicit standards
for those who apply the law."0 6 However, the court also noted the
Supreme Court's warning against applying the vagueness doctrine
mechanically; the Supreme Court "emphasiz[ed] that an 'economic
regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test' and there should be
'greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties
because 7 the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less se20
vere.'"
In applying a void-for-vagueness analysis to the FCRA's statutory
damages provision, the court noted that ranges of statutory damages are
not unique to the FCRA. 2" s The court also noted that the FCRA's
statutory damages scheme, as compared to other statutes with statutory
damage provisions, contained a smaller, more limited range of potential
damages, "starting at $100 per violation, with liability for a single
violation capped at $1,000. "2 09 The defendants in Harris had
not argue[d] that statutory-damages ranges are categorically impermissible, but rather that the absence of criteria to aid juries in determin-

205. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629
(1984)).

206. Id. at 1311 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to
the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any
legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399,
402-03 (1966)).
207. Id. at 1310 (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982)).
208. Id. at 1311.
209. Id. By way of comparison, the court cited the statutory damages ranges in the
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.), and the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615b (2006),
both of which contain larger statutory damages ranges than does the FCRA. Harris,564
F.3d at 1311.
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ing the appropriate amount of statutory damages within the $100 to
$1,000 range render[ed] the FCRA unconstitutionally vague because it:
(1) deprives potential defendants of notice of the consequences of
violating the FCRA; and (2) results in arbitrarily assessed damages
awards.210
Disagreeing with the defendants, the court held that the FCRA does
provide potential defendants with notice of the consequences of
noncompliance because the FCRA clearly defines prohibited conduct and
the potential range of fines. 21 ' Specifically, "the [FCRA] gives potential defendants notice that if they violate FACTA, they will be subject to
penalties of $100 to $1,000 per violation. "212 The court "therefore
conclude[d] that the [FCRA] satisfies due process by giving sufficient
21 3
notice to potential violators" of the consequences of noncompliance.
The court further found that the FCRA does not provide juries with
"unfettered discretion" so as to render their verdicts "arbitrary."
2 14
Rather, the FCRA "clearly limits juries' discretion by mandating that
statutory damages ... reside between $100 and $1,000. "215 Because
"valuation of harm [conducted by juries] is limited to a narrow,
statutorily-established range," the court held that juries were "not
impermissibly asked to perform a legislative function" and that "[tihe
mere potential for disuniform verdicts is not enough to create a
constitutional infirmity."2 6 Accordingly, the court "conclude[d] that
§ [1681n(a)(1)(A)] is not unconstitutionally vague on its face."217
(b) Facial Excessiveness. Next, the Eleventh Circuit turned to the
issue of whether the FCRA's statutory damages provision is unconstitutionally excessive on its face. 21' The district court had held § 1681n(a)(1)(A) to be unconstitutionally excessive upon determining that it is
"'expressly not compensatory in nature,'"2 " and thus "punitive in
nature." 22 The district court found that "because only litigants that
have not suffered any actual harm will avail themselves of statutory
damages under [§ 1681n(a)(1)(A)I, these damages will always be

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Harris, 564 F.3d at 1311.
Id.at 1311-12.
Id.at 1312.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Grimes, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1308).
Id. (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919)).
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unconstitutionally excessive when compared to the actual harm caused
by the violator's actions."22
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's finding that
the FCRA's statutory-damages provision was punitive in nature.22 2
The court noted that "[pirior to the 1996 amendment to FCRA, the
statue permitted victims of willful violations to obtain actual and
punitive damages. " 2"3 "The current version of [the] FCRA provides
that plaintiffs may elect to receive actual damages or statutory damages,
but not both, and [also] maintains the punitive damages provision."2 24
"Because the FCRA already contains a punitive damages provision, and
specifies that statutory damages may only be awarded in lieu of actual
damages," the Eleventh Circuit held that "the district court erred in
concluding that the statutory damages provision is tantamount to a
punitive damages provision."226
The court further held that "even if the statutory damages provision
could be construed as punitive, the district court still erred in ruling that
[§ 1681n(a)(1)(A)] always yields unconstitutionally excessive verdicts."226 In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "the FCRA
does not forbid individuals who suffered actual harm from seeking
statutory damages ." 22' Thus, it would be "conceivable that ...a party
with actual harm that is difficult to compute [would] bring a case
seeking statutory damages ." 228 "In such a case," the court explained
229
that "the actual harm might be very close to the statutory damages"
and that the "mere possibility of a constitutional application is enough
to defeat a facial challenge to the statute."2 ' Accordingly, the court
held that § 1681n(a)(1)(A) is not unconstitutionally excessive on its face
and vacated and remaded the district court's decision. 3
IV. CONCLUSION

The 2009 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions, many of
which concerned issues of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.
While this Article is not intended to be exhaustive, the Authors have

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 1312-13.
Id. at 1313.
Id.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing High 01' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 673 F.2d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 1982)).
Id.
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attempted to provide material that will be useful to practitioners by
providing relevant updates in the area of federal trial practice and
procedure in the Eleventh Circuit.

